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Abstract
The very high level and constant 
growth in salaries for corporate 
executives has been a trend causing 
debate for over a decade now.  It 
has given rise to a range of argu-
ments for and against high salary 
levels.  The single most prevalent 
argument for high executive salaries 
has been the argument based on 
economic efficiency.  In this argu-
ment, high salaries for corporate 
executives are justified as they form 
an incentive that motivates them to 
high performance.  While striving 
to earn these incentives, executives 
achieve improvements to produc-
tivity in their firm, which benefits 
society. This paper considers the 
argument from economic efficiency 
from a philosophical viewpoint.  
Arguments for and against this jus-
tification are examined for consist-
ency with philosophical (distributive 
justice) and economic theory to test 
their logical soundness.  Empirical 
evidence from Australian and United 
States salary markets is also exam-
ined where relevant to conclude on 
the validity of the arguments. Most 
arguments for high executive pay 
are shown to be unsound in that 
they assume cause and effect by 
linking the executive’s actions to the 
corporation’s performance.  Philo-
sophically, the efficiency argument 
may be valid, provided empirical evi-
dence confirms that high executive 
pay leads to improved societal well-
being.  However on the evidence of 
most studies that is not empirically 
true for executives in Australia and 
the United States
Introduction
Th is paper considers corporate execu-
tive salaries from the viewpoint of philo-
sophical (consequentialist) theories of 
distributive justice.  Th at is, it considers 
whether the level of such salaries can be 
morally justifi ed for the society in which 
the corporation operates.  Th is paper will 
examine one category of commonly cited 
justifi cations for high corporate executive 
salaries - arguments from economic effi  -
ciency.  Th ese arguments for high rewards 
for leaders of corporations conceived as 
an incentive type argument. Th at is, the 
rewards are (ethically) justifi ed in so far 
as they provide an incentive towards an 
outcome that increases utility in the so-
ciety.
Th ere are a multitude of corporate 
structures and terminologies used in 
capitalist economies.  For purposes of 
this discussion we will focus on publicly 
listed corporations (or fi rms) typical of 
those traded on stock markets.  Th ese 
are defi ned as consisting of shareholders, 
directors representing shareholder inter-
ests, executives reporting to the directors, 
and employees managed by the execu-
tives ( Jensen and Mecklin 1976).  Execu-
tives are employees with power over the 
corporation’s assets.
Th is paper was prepared largely before 
the advent of the global fi nancial crisis of 
late 2008.  Data considered is based on 
market conditions as they were prior to 
the severe declines in share values that 
occurred during the crisis.  Although not 
examined in this paper, it is considered 
that the fi nancial shock and subsequent 
events validate some of the concerns 
raised here about corporate executive 
salaries and raise further concerns. 
Corporations and 
Ethical Justifi cation
From a consequentialist (utilitarian) eth-
ical viewpoint, an activity will be justifi ed 
if is benefi cial to the whole community of 
interest that the activity is practiced in. 
For most corporations this community of 
interest will be the society or nation-state 
it is incorporated in, and for international 
corporations it will be the international 
community.
Th e structure of corporations is such 
that the potential benefi t and motiva-
tions for each stakeholder group in them 
is diff erent.  If the corporation is carry-
ing out a socially benefi cial activity the 
society will wish it to be profi table and 
continue.  Depending on the structure of 
rewards within the corporation, if each 
stakeholder group within it acts through 
rational self-interest they may all have 
some varying degree of motivation to see 
the corporation be profi table and contin-
ue.  Th ey may still diff er in their prefer-
ences for the distribution of the benefi ts 
of a corporation’s activities.  
Economic Effi ciency Argument
Jensen (1990) and others used empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that there was a 
link between large pay bonuses provided 
to executives on a performance basis and 
improved corporate performance .  Th ese 
theories in part motivated the trend be-
ginning in the 1990s of deliberate struc-
turing of corporate executive salaries to 
match performance of the corporation 
as closely as possible, usually through 
options to purchase shares in the com-
pany on advantageous terms off ered to 
the executive.  Over time the under-cost-
ing and over-issuing of such bonuses has 
led to much higher salaries and Jensen’s 
objectives not being realized.  However 
this misapplication does not necessarily 
invalidate Jensen’s theory.  It is economi-
cally rational for corporations to pay ex-
ecutives bonuses such as those espoused 
by Jensen if it increases the economic ef-
fi ciency of the fi rm and returns to share-
holders.
Jensen was considering executive 
pay from a purely economic viewpoint 
in terms of the fi rm’s self-interest.  For 
philosophical justifi cation this is a neces-
sary but not suffi  cient condition for the 
economic effi  ciency criteria to be satisfi ed 
by high executive pay.   For high executive 
pay to be economically effi  cient it must 
be such that:
- high executive pay increases econom-
ic effi  ciency for the fi rm and 
- greater effi  ciency for the fi rm im-
proves social utility.
Th e following conditions are also re-
quired to be satisfi ed for the corporation: 
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- gains from increased effi  ciency for the fi rm exceed the cost 
to the corporation of the high executive pay;
- gains from increased effi  ciency for the fi rm exceed the “op-
portunity cost” of the high executive pay. Th at is, there is not a 
more effi  cient way available to the corporation to achieve the 
same or greater gains at lesser cost.
An important qualifi cation on this theory is that high execu-
tive salary needs to result in a benefi t to the society for it to be 
justifi ed in terms of consequentialist ethics.  Increased returns 
to the fi rm are not suffi  cient.  Increased effi  ciency for the fi rm is 
a potential justifi cation, but the effi  ciency must increase social 
utility either directly or indirectly.  
Th is means that the corporation must not be engaged in a 
legal but socially harmful activity.  Improved effi  ciency for a 
corporation engaged in such an activity would not ethically jus-
tify a high salary for an executive.  Even in benefi cial activities, 
improvements in economic effi  ciency may create negative exter-
nalities that are not internalized and lead to social harm.  Th ere 
must be a net benefi t to society to be ethically justifi ed.
Similarly, improved effi  ciency for an individual corporation 
that gives it a competitive advantage but with no benefi t fl ow-
ing to the society would also not justify high salary.  Examples 
of such cases might include improvements to increase market 
share by dominant corporations within an industry, where ben-
efi ts may be confi ned to the corporation’s shareholders but not 
distributed within the society in which the goods are produced 
or consumed. For these fi rms a high salary to attract talented 
executives would be a rational strategy in pursuing the corpora-
tion’s own self- interest. Th e society in which they operate will 
be indiff erent to gains in economic effi  ciency in such fi rms, if 
they merely result in a transfer of wealth or market share from 
one corporation to another.
More normally, gains in factor effi  ciency by a corporation 
should result in gains in social utility in the long term.  Un-
less the corporation is a monopoly any gains will be won at the 
expense of other market competitors.  Th ese other fi rms will 
then have to either increase their own effi  ciency or lose market 
share.  Over time more and more of the goods produced in that 
market will be produced more effi  ciently, and the price off ered 
to consumers should be reduced by competition.  (Th is will not 
hold for unregulated monopolies, where the benefi ts may not be 
passed on beyond the corporation, or multi-national corpora-
tions where the benefi ts may accrue to other societies.)  Provid-
ed the industry is not a monopoly, social utility should benefi t in 
the long run from effi  ciency gains by a corporation.
Provided that the increased productive effi  ciency of the cor-
poration leads to growth in overall societal income and wealth, 
and that the income and wealth is fairly distributed within the 
society, it should then benefi t all or most members of the society 
in the long run.  Th e high executive salary may then be justifi ed 
in consequentialist terms by being in the long term interests of 
all members of the society.   Philosophically economic effi  ciency 
as a justifi cation for executive salaries is, in terms of distributive 
justice, a form of incentive theory, loosely framed around (soci-
etal) welfare principles.
Jonathon Riley has described this as a “second best” theory. 
Th at is, it is only a partial justifi cation, and applies if and only 
if the empirical evidence actually supports the claim.  Th ere is 
no inherent benefi t to the society in high rewards to executives 
in themselves, and arguably some dis-benefi t from the eff ects 
they will have on social equity.  Th us the high rewards are only 
ethically justifi ed for the society if the high rewards lead to ad-
ditional benefi ts to the society.
Empirically it is diffi  cult to prove this argument either way. 
At the macro level there is a strong basis for economic effi  ciency 
arguments in the history of economic philosophy.  Adam Smith 
(1776) cited the long term advantages to a society from in-
creased economic effi  ciency as the primary benefi t and reason 
for a market-based capitalist economic system.  Th e countries 
having systems that encouraged economic effi  ciency were gener-
ally the richest at the time when Smith wrote.  By the year 2000 
all of the world’s richest nations had market-based capitalist 
economies.  Th ese nations almost without exception enjoy the 
highest per capita incomes, longest life expectancy, and provide 
the greatest benefi ts to their citizens  (based on OECD statis-
tics and UN Global Development Index). 
However the fact that the nations with most effi  cient corpo-
rations are generally the societies with highest utility does not 
prove that effi  cient corporations are the cause.  Other factors 
such as better education systems, infrastructure, social change 
and technological change might all be identifi ed as possible 
causes of economic growth.  Effi  cient corporations might be a 
product of economic growth in a nation, rather than the cause.
At the level of individual fi rms it is more diffi  cult to validate 
the economic effi  ciency argument.  It would be necessary to 
demonstrate that high executive salaries cause more corpora-
tions to become more effi  cient to justify them based on econom-
ic effi  ciency.  Th is would require proof both that the actions of 
executives caused greater effi  ciency in corporations, and that it 
was the high executive salaries that motivated the executive’s ac-
tions.  In both cases, defi ning the eff ects of executives’ decisions 
on a corporation’s effi  ciency is extremely diffi  cult.
Th e practical diffi  culty at the level of individual fi rms is the 
same as for any contribution based theory applied to groups – it 
cannot be shown that gains in economic effi  ciency for a group 
are the result of the actions or eff orts of any one member of the 
group, including the executive.  If gains in the performance of 
a corporation are examined in isolation, they may be the result 
of economic, organisational or technological improvements that 
aff ect (at least) other fi rms in that industry.  For this reason most 
studies of executive performance rely on comparing perform-
ance between corporations in the same industry or market.  Th e 
studies then make the assumption that any diff erences in form’s 
performance are due to diff erences in executive leadership.  Th is 
ignores the potential for other internal and external infl uences, 
such as exceptional contributions from other members of the 
corporation.  Hence it is likely to overstate the value of executive 
contributions where improvements occur.  Nevertheless, com-
parative performance of a fi rm within an industry appears to be 
the best proxy available for measuring executive performance.
For corporations which do not have better than average per-
formance, which will be most fi rms, it will not be possible to 
identify any contribution by the executive, which may greatly 
understate their contribution.  For these reasons the compara-
tive analysis should be carried out over time, with the change in 
relative performance over time compared with that fi rm’s start-
ing position in the industry used as a proxy of executive per-
formance.  Th is would require the performance component of 
executive pay to be made after the fact, when long term results 
are known. (Th is is consistent with current practices of delay-
ing the time when executive share options may be exercised.) 
Th e results of comparative analysis of performance would then 
justify diff erentials between performance pay for individuals, 
although they would not justify any particular level of pay for 
executives.
Logically, if it is believed that executive performance is the 
primary determinate of comparative corporate performance, 
then some executives are also presumably responsible for the 
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losses on investment (relative to opportunity costs) incurred by 
any fi rm with below average performance.   In such cases the 
value of the executive’s performance is presumably a very large 
negative value, meriting dismissal or sanction, rather than any 
level of reward.  Yet none of the studies trying to link executive 
pay and performance ( Jensen et al) have attempted to measure 
the cost or loss induced by poor executive performance.
A fi nal diffi  culty is that, even if the contribution to a corpora-
tion of executives’ decisions can be isolated, it may not be possi-
ble to isolate the performance of the CEO from the performance 
of the rest of the executive group.  One possible way to overcome 
this would be by identifying the period when a particular CEO 
was present and isolating the performance during their tenure 
from that before and after.  Th e diffi  culty with this is that the 
impact of many decisions on corporate restructuring or strategy 
by a CEO may take time to take eff ect.  Th us the full benefi ts 
or disbenefi ts of their decisions may not emerge till some time 
later.  A solution would be to treat performance bonuses for the 
executive group in an identical fashion, distributing benefi ts to 
a pre-agreed formula at a later time when comparative industry 
performance is known.
Alternative Arguments: Economics of Superstars
Other arguments have been raised to explain the existence of 
high executive salary, but they are not ethical justifi cations.  An 
example is the claim that executive salaries are an example of 
“the economics of superstars”.  Th ere are some fi elds, notably 
sporting, arts and entertainment, where “superstar” performers 
may earn rewards far greater than the average for that fi eld.  Th e 
potential incomes in these fi elds have the character of prizes in 
a tournament, with a comparatively small number of prizes rela-
tive to the number of competitors.
It has been recognized in economic analysis by Rosen (1983) 
that in such highly competitive fi elds, a slight edge in perform-
ance may create a signifi cant increase in the chance of competi-
tive success.  Th is allows more talented performers to charge 
an economic rent for their performance and attract a reward 
premium far greater than the actual diff erence in performance. 
Th e employer of the superstar (or the superstar themselves if 
eff ectively self-employed) can then charge users or spectators a 
premium fee for the performance.  Th us very high rewards for 
superstars might still be in the rational self-interest of the em-
ployer. 
Th is theory has been suggested to explain very high rewards 
for corporate executives with exceptional performance (Gabaix 
and Landier 2005).  It can be applied to corporate executives 
at two levels – comparing salaries between CEOs of diff erent 
fi rms, and between the salary of CEO and other employees 
within a fi rm.  
Considered at the level of comparing CEOs between fi rms, 
if exceptional CEOs can generate exceptional performance for 
their fi rm, this theory would predict and justify a large range of 
CEO salaries, ranging from very low for poor to average execu-
tives, to very high for exceptional executives.  Th e actual distri-
bution of CEO salaries is not as would be predicted by this the-
ory.  While there are some CEOs paid more than others, none 
are paid poorly, and the average salary for CEOs is exceptional 
(Bebchuck and Grinstein 2005).  
Considered at the level of comparative salary within fi rms, 
this theory might justify a wide variation of salaries between 
CEOs and other corporate executives.  In this case, the position 
and salary of CEO could act as a prize that executives compete 
for, motivating higher performance from the executives, to the 
benefi t of the corporation (Benjamin 2002).  While this appli-
cation of the theory would implicitly acknowledge that CEO 
salaries were not justifi ed by the performance of the CEO, it 
would justify high executive reward if the overall performance 
of the corporate executive as a group produced a corresponding 
benefi t to the shareholder and/or community.
Arguments Against Economic Effi  ciency Justifi cation
Having considered the arguments for economic effi  ciency as 
a justifi cation for high executive pay, there are also several coun-
ter arguments to examine.  Th ese fall into four broad catego-
ries – (1) other causes of effi  ciency, (2) objections from more 
sophisticated motivational theories of behavior, (3) supply and 
demand and (4) burden of proof arguments.
(1) Other Causes of Effi ciency
Measured at the societal level, a range of political, social, and 
technological changes may cause economic and social advances, 
apart from the business effi  ciencies that may be generated by 
a single executive or corporation.  Th e economic growth and 
prosperity enjoyed by most OECD nations in the 1990s might 
just as easily be traced to other causes such as the “peace divi-
dend” from the end of the cold war, increased computerization, 
the baby boom ensuring record high workforce participation, 
and the increasing globalization of world trade.  Th ere seems 
no reason to attribute the global growth trend particularly to 
corporate management decisions.
Th e most comprehensive studies to date of the causes of busi-
ness effi  ciency and competitiveness were those carried out by 
Micheal Porter in the 1980s and 1990s.  Porter (1990) devel-
oped a model of factors that consistently infl uenced the success 
of diff erent businesses.  Economic effi  ciency of the corporation 
or industry itself (regardless of cause) was only one factor in a 
fi rm or industry’s success.  One factor, government policy, was 
beyond the direct control of the corporation.  Th e other four 
factors were external infl uences that fi rms had to respond to, 
rather than things they led.  Corporate leadership was not iden-
tifi ed as a signifi cant factor, although it might be argued that it 
infl uences the response to some of the causal factors.
In an Australian study the apparent causes of improved effi  -
ciency have included scale economies, technological innovations, 
X (factor)-effi  ciency gains and the removal of behavior aimed at 
merely satisfi cing performance targets rather than maximizing 
performance (Quiggan 1998).  Gains in factor effi  ciency may 
have been due to corporate leadership, such as through restruc-
turing of corporations.  Th is is plausible but diffi  cult to prove.  It 
cannot be isolated from other potential causes of factor effi  cien-
cy gains, such as changes to regulation or government policy. 
For example, reforms to labor markets might improve factor ef-
fi ciency in an industry regardless of the actions of an individual 
executive.  Even where the fortunes of a single corporation had 
a determining and benefi cial eff ect on a single nation’s economy, 
such as the Nokia corporation’s growth relative to the Finnish 
economy in the 1990s, that success has not been linked to the 
actions of any single executive (Haikio 2002).
Th e existence of alternative causes for corporate success and 
diffi  culties in measurement does not disprove that executive 
leadership aff ects corporate performance. It could be argued 
that putting an idea into practice, particularly in a large com-
plex organizational environment, is a diffi  cult task in itself and 
deserves pay separate to the desert base of conceiving the idea. 
Th us even if an executive has not developed the products or in-
novations responsible for improved performance, and is simply 
putting into practice standard concepts of management theory, 
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that practice still generates value and deserves reward.  In this 
case the desert base is the relative eff ectiveness with which some 
new organizational or technological change is implemented in 
the fi rm.  Th e other employees of the fi rm who must carry out 
the change also share in the desert base of any improvements re-
sulting to the fi rm’s performance.  Th e desert base for the execu-
tive is, once again, some share of the comparative improvement 
of the performance of the fi rm relative to other fi rms in the 
same industry with similar organisation and technology.  Th ere 
still seems no justifi cation to attribute all of the gains from the 
change in the fi rm’s performance solely to the desert base of the 
executive.
(2) Executive Motivation
Th e effi  ciency argument assumes that the predominant motiva-
tion infl uencing the behavior of corporate executives while car-
rying out their duties as an executive is personal fi nancial gain 
in the form of salary.  It relies on closely linking the salary to 
the corporation’s performance, typically measured through the 
share price.  Th is assumption has been explicitly used by those 
in favor of high executive pay justifi ed by links to corporate per-
formance, such as Murphy and Jensen (1990).  Th ere are alter-
native theories which may be applied to executive motivation 
that would give diff erent conclusions.
Economic viewpoint: Income and Substitution Effects
Th e assumption that CEOs motivated by salary will strive for 
greater corporate effi  ciency if paid more is simplistic from an 
economic viewpoint.  It ignores the fact that there are two recog-
nized eff ects on the supply of any type of labor from an increase 
in the price of that labor – an income eff ect and a substitution 
eff ect.  Th ese act in opposite directions.
Th e income eff ect means that the increased income per unit 
of work supplied will allow at least some workers in that fi eld 
to reduce their hours of work and receive the same income, or 
retire early where rewards are suffi  ciently high.  Th ey may then 
substitute some of their work hours for leisure hours, thereby 
increasing their total utility.  Th e substitution eff ect means that 
an increase in labor income will make workers more willing to 
work in that fi eld, increasing the supply of labor.  
For the effi  ciency argument to be true, it must always be the 
case that the substitution eff ect is greater than the income ef-
fect in the executive labor market.  Given that corporate execu-
tives are already the most highly paid occupational group in the 
world, and thus the fi nancial inducements for individuals to en-
ter and work in the fi eld are already greater than for any other 
occupation, this assumption seems highly doubtful.  Put simply, 
no additional eff ort would be expected from paying executive 
management higher salaries, when their salaries are already suf-
fi cient to satisfy any reasonable needs on their part.  Similarly 
at a group level, no additional persons would be expected to be 
attracted to a career in executive management by higher salaries, 
when those salaries are already higher than for any competing 
career.
Another diffi  culty implicit in this argument is that, even if 
economic effi  ciency is improved by an executive, it is not a suffi  -
cient reason to prove that a fi rm needed to off er an exceptionally 
high executive reward to achieve that result.  Th e effi  ciency ar-
gument contradicts the normal behavioral assumptions of fi rms 
hiring all other types of labor, where it is assumed that most 
individuals maximize utility by satisfi cing income in combina-
tion with other working conditions.  For most employers, it is 
desirable to hire employees that are highly effi  cient.  However 
the method is not to pay the highest rewards to all employees 
to achieve the highest performance.  Firms pay rewards that are 
( just) high enough to motivate the desired level of performance. 
Firms seek to optimize their pay rates relative to worker per-
formance, not to seek maximum performance at any price.  It is 
not rational for corporate boards acting as employers on behalf 
of shareholders to pay corporate executives any more than the 
reward level suffi  cient to attract the executive to that position 
and motivate high performance.
Psychological Viewpoint: Motivational Theories
Th e claim that higher salaries will act as a motivator for execu-
tives may also be considered from a psychological viewpoint. 
One of the seminal investigations into the motivations that in-
fl uenced employee performance in businesses was by Maslow 
(1943).  Maslow identifi ed a hierarchy of psychological forces 
that motivated individuals.  Th ese were ranked from primary 
needs (for survival), followed by three other levels of “defi ciency 
needs” to a higher level of growth needs.  Maslow’s theory was 
that primary needs had to be satisfi ed fi rst, and that individuals 
then sought the higher level growth needs.
Defi ciency needs:
• physical needs (able to provide food, clothing, shelter etc)
• security (certainty of position, values, belongings), 
• belonging (to a group eg fi rm or category of executives)
• esteem (respect for position)
Growth needs:
• self-actualisation (creativity through setting direction of 
fi rm)
For the executive, physical needs have probably already been 
satisfi ed in the preceding middle management career and are 
not relevant.  Security is arguably reduced for the executive, due 
to higher risk of dismissal for poor performance.  Satisfaction 
of the need for belonging is also questionable, as the holding of 
the power to discipline or dismiss other employees in a fi rm pre-
sumably reduces the ties of friendship to them.  Conversely, the 
existence of an “old boys club” among executives suggests that 
being an executive represents belonging to a prestige group in 
itself. Th e desire for esteem would appear to be readily satisfi ed 
by executive employment for the same reason.  Th e satisfaction 
of the desire for self-actualisation through executive employ-
ment is considerable, with frequent decision making, problem 
solving, and the opportunity to create a new direction for a large 
complex structure of people.
It could be argued that executive employment also contradicts 
Maslow’s theory in some respects.  Many executive contracts 
represent individuals trading off  defi ciency needs (eg security 
of employment) for growth needs (e.g. self-actualisation/abil-
ity to direct the fi rm).  Th e less popular aspects of executive 
employment (cutting cost through dismissal of staff , accepting 
salaries many times higher than fellow staff  and citizens) might 
threaten the need for belonging and esteem.
Maslow’s theory has been criticized by subsequent behavioral 
researchers.  For example, Wahba and Bridwell (1976) found 
that there was little empirical evidence for Maslow’s ranking of 
needs, or any apparent hierarchy.  Neef and others have argued 
that fundamental human needs as identifi ed by Maslow are on-
tologically diff erent and cannot be ranked or compared.   On 
balance, it would be better to say that there are a range of dif-
ferent psychological needs and desires, which executive employ-
ment will satisfy to varying degrees.  Whether taking Maslow’s 
view, Neef ’s, or others’, it does not seem plausible to say that 
additional executive salary will in itself satisfy psychological 
motivations on the part of the executive.  Off ering continually 
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higher salary may simply predetermine a category of persons to 
become executives, namely those who value salary more highly 
than other motivations normally considered by persons.
It has been suggested that executives seek higher salaries in 
comparison to other executives, as a means of recognizing com-
parative ability or performance.  Th at is, high salary is a means of 
recognizing the status of the executive amongst their executive 
peers.  In this case new provisions for the reporting of executive 
salaries as a means of restraining them would be self defeating. 
Th e information about salaries of executive peers would • serve 
to motivate executives to seek parity with any more highly paid 
executive.  If executives with superior to average performance 
then received a higher salary it would result in a cycle of con-
tinual increase of executive salary, precisely as has been actually 
happening.  Th e resulting increasing level of executive salaries 
would not be justifi ed by increasing performance. 
Th is motivation explains the desire for continually increasing 
executive salaries, but does not justify them.  Nor does it explain 
why the higher salaries are agreed to.  Recognition of ability is 
an understandable desire in members of every profession, and 
higher salary is one of the means of providing it.  Yet it is not the 
case that salaries in every other profession are continually rising 
in real terms.  Th us the desire for recognition might explain the 
motivation of executives seeking higher salaries, but does not 
explain why they are awarded.  Th is motivation also has the un-
desirable feature that executives may seek higher salary as proof 
of their ability, irrespective of performance.
As there is not evidence that highly paid executives benefi t in-
dividual corporations, a more logical strategy for a corporation 
rationally pursuing its own self-interest is to act as a free-rider 
with respect to executive salaries.  Th at is, if the corporation had 
the lowest executive salaries, while based in the nation having on 
average the highest paid executives, it would gain the benefi ts of 
being in the most effi  cient nation, while having the least cost in 
executive rewards paid.  Th e apparent absence of such behavior 
on the part of corporations suggests that their boards of direc-
tors do not pursue the rational self interest of the corporation 
when executive salaries are agreed. 
If these motivational theories are correct, then there would 
appear to be potential to motivate executives through the use of 
alternative non-fi nancial prizes or rewards for superior executive 
leadership as markers of status or recognition for high perform-
ance.  Th ese would satisfy the desire for esteem and comparative 
recognition, but not create a cost burden for shareholders.
(3) Supply and Demand Arguments
Another major argument against high corporate rewards on the 
basis of economic effi  ciency is based on the theory of equilibrat-
ing markets, which contradicts the continued trend of corporate 
executive rewards to rise. According to economic theory any fi eld 
where resources are in demand, including labor markets, will see 
at fi rst a rise in the price off ered for the resource.  Th e market 
will then adjust so that more resources enter that fi eld.  Th e 
price will then adjust down so that returns to those resources 
equate to normal levels of reward.  Where this does not occur 
it is generally seen as evidence of rent-seeking behavior by own-
ers of the resources, and a market that is not perfectly competi-
tive.  Such markets are unlikely to deliver effi  cient outcomes and 
hence not be socially optimal.
Th ere may be a valid case to say that the demand for cor-
porate executives is growing.  Th e relative proportion of the 
world’s economic activity carried out by large corporations has 
been growing in the long term (Galbraith 1967).  Th is trend has 
accelerated since the end of the cold war with the replacement 
of most nominally Communist economies with market-based 
capitalist economies containing privately owned corporations. 
Within most OECD countries, the trend has been to reduce the 
proportion of government spending (other than welfare) and 
privatize many formerly government-owned businesses as cor-
porations.  Th e size of individual corporations has also grown 
in real terms, with 51 of the 100 largest economic entities in the 
world being corporations by the year 2000 (Anderson & Cavan-
agh 2000).  Within each corporation, while other staff  functions 
have typically been “downsized” or “outsourced” throughout the 
1990s, there appears to be no trend to do this to executive posi-
tions.  Th us overall there are more and larger corporations than 
before, and therefore a need for more executives.
However if the demand has risen, the supply has risen more 
dramatically.  Th e number of persons being educated in the dis-
ciplines seen as entry level qualifi cations into business manage-
ment careers – accountancy, business, economics and law – have 
greatly increased in all OECD countries.  If these are indeed 
the skills required, then the supply of labor has increased to 
the point where some correction in the price of executive labor 
might be expected.  If the supply of persons with the required 
skills to be an executive has not increased after two decades of 
constant increases in executive salary, this is contrary to labor 
market theory and raises the question of what blocks or pre-
vents increases in the skill supply.  
Some might argue that the critical skills for success as an ex-
ecutive are not gained from such formal education.  Th is leaves 
two other possibilities – either the required skills are inherent 
qualities that cannot be taught, or they can be learnt through 
experience in the business concerned.  If the required skills are 
inherent, then the supply of individuals with them will be fi xed 
and not infl uenced by executive salary levels.  If they are learnt 
from experience, then it is encumbent on current executives 
working for the good of their corporation to give opportunities 
to potential executives to develop their skills, so that there will 
be a suffi  cient number of replacements for themselves.  If there 
has not been a suffi  cient number of future replacements trained 
so that there is a shortage of labor with executive skills, it would 
seem perverse to reward executives with higher rewards now 
because of their or previous executives past failure to train ad-
equate replacements.
In reality, no shortage of applicants for such positions is re-
ported.  In an era of increasing skill shortages as the “baby-boom” 
generation retires, various professions are listed as being under-
supplied but positions for corporate executives never make such 
lists.  Since most executive positions are not advertised, it seems 
more accurate to say that these positions are only accessible to 
a small number of persons, but this does not prove that only a 
small number of persons would be able to perform them.
(4) Burden of Proof
Authors such as Nichols and Subramanian (2001) have correct-
ly pointed out that some attacks on high executive rewards are 
unsubstantiated because of diffi  culties in measuring the value of 
executive actions in corporations.  Th us the claim that executive 
rewards are too high is unproven.  However in principle Nichols 
and Subramanian have reversed the burden of proof for justify-
ing high executive rewards.  Executives receive, and have sought 
to justify, higher levels of reward than all other occupations. 
Given this exceptional level of reward, it would seem that the 
burden of proof for their justifi cation rests on those claiming, or 
seeking to justify, the exceptionally high levels of reward.  
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For any employer to approve an exceptionally high level of 
reward for an employee, presumably the employer would want 
to be satisfi ed that it was justifi ed.  In the absence of such proof, 
a reasonable employer might pay the employee the average level 
of reward, but would seem to have little reason to go beyond 
this.  In the same manner, for corporate directors to approve 
what are exceptionally high levels of reward for executives, pre-
sumably they would want some evidence of it being deserved. 
Otherwise the directors would have failed in their duty to pro-
tect shareholders’ interests, from whose returns the reward must 
ultimately be paid.
Empirical Evidence – National and Societal Level
At the national level it is possible to compare economic perform-
ance with CEO pay as reported in World Bank statistics.  Th is 
has been done for selected countries where data up to 2006/07 
is available for CEO pay, average income, GDP growth rate and 
share market index returns.  Th e statistics have been adjusted 
to show net impacts per person for comparison.  Average CEO 
pay has been divided by average income to obtain an index rep-
resenting how high CEO pay is relative to average pay for each 
country.  Similarly GDP Growth rate has been divided by pop-
ulation growth to obtain a GDP growth rate per capita.
CEO pay as reported by the world bank is shown against av-
erage incomes in Figure One.  Generally CEO pay is propor-
tional to, and much larger than, average income.  Th e pay rate 
for US CEOs appears to be an outlier.  For subsequent graphs 
CEO pay has been reported as a multiple of average income.
Figure One – CEO Pay Compared with Average Income
National GDP growth rate per capita is compared with the 
CEO pay multiple (of average incomes) in Figure Two and 
with unadjusted CEO pay in Figure Th ree.  From these GDP 
growth appears to be inversely related to raw CEO pay.  Th at is, 
the higher the CEO pay, the lower the economic growth rate. 
When CEO pay is adjusted to a multiple of average incomes 
there is no obvious relationhsip apparent in the data.  At best, 
there appears to be no evidence at the national level that com-
paratively high CEO pay leads to higher national income or eco-
nomic growth.
Figure Two – GDP Growth Rate compared with CEO Pay multiple
Figure Three – GDP Growth Rate compared with CEO pay
Proponents of high CEO pay might argue that it is better 
measured against corporate returns, as national GDP growth 
is aff ected by many factors beyond the CEO’s control.  Average 
share market returns over ten years for (publicly listed) corpo-
rations is compared with the CEO pay multiple (of average in-
comes) in Figure Four and with unadjusted CEO pay in Figure 
Five.  Again there is no obvious relationship apparent in the data 
where higher CEO pay leads to higher share index returns.  Th e 
best performed share markets appear to be those where CEO 
pays is average to low.
Figure Four – Share Index Returns compared with CEO pay
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Figure Five – Share Index Returns compared with CEO pay
Empirical Evidence – Corporate Level
Acknowledging measurement diffi  culties, recent studies have 
examined empirical evidence on the relationship between execu-
tive pay and corporate performance.  Th ese analyses are diffi  cult 
to perform because it is not possible to isolate the eff ect of the 
executive’s decisions from other factors which aff ect the corpo-
ration’s performance.  Firstly, the performance of a corporation 
must be isolated from other general economic trends, preferably 
by comparing its performance to that of its market competitors. 
Secondly, it must be assumed that this comparative perform-
ance of a corporation during the period a particular executive 
controls it are due to that executive’s decisions.  Th is method 
potentially overstates the value of an executive’s contribution, 
since it ignores other potential sources of comparative improve-
ment in the corporation.  
Most empirical analysis assumes that CEOs ability to infl u-
ence corporate performance depends on their degree of control 
over the organization. Adams, Almeida and Ferriera (2005) 
have shown that fi rms with structures giving greater power to 
the CEO have more variable performance than other fi rms, 
both for better or worse.  Th is suggests that the CEO role is 
infl uential.
Nohria (2001) analysed diff erential corporate performance 
in each US industry group.  He found that, assuming CEOs 
were responsible for the diff erential performance change that 
occurred during their period of control, their infl uence was at 
most 21% of performance improvements (in Communications 
Equipment) and at worst 2% of performance improvements (in 
meat products).  In this way Nohria concluded that on aver-
age 14% of the gains in performance made by US corporations 
could be linked to decisions made by the corporation’s execu-
tive.  
If we accept the assumption that it is the CEO’s actions that 
aff ect changes in a fi rms performance relative to its market ri-
vals, then it is possible to compare CEO pay and performance. 
Daines, Nair and Kornhauser (2005) refer to a continuation of 
good performance of a fi rm relative to its rivals or change in 
poor performance as being due to CEO “skill”.  Th ey showed 
that there were instances of when CEOs paid higher than aver-
age did display high “skill” (i.e. good relative performance) and 
other instances where CEOs paid higher than average did not 
display such skill.  Overall they found that highly paid CEOs 
displayed high skill when the pay was performance based, and 
when there was a single large shareholder.  Where one or both 
of these factors was absent high pay did not guarantee a highly 
skilled CEO.  Th is suggests that it is possible that high CEO 
pay may be justifi ed in cases of exceptional performance.  Con-
versely, it shows that high CEO pay does not in itself guarantee 
high performance, and also does not explain the high average 
level of CEO pay, only diff erences between pay of individual 
CEOs.
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) undertook a comprehensive re-
view of empirical studies of CEO pay in the United States. 
Th ey concluded that in the majority of cases, high CEO pay 
was not due to performance but due to a windfall gain from an 
overall rise in the share market.  Many CEO pay contracts did 
not rigorously link CEO pay to relative performance.  Th e fact 
that bonuses for “exceptional” performance were invariably paid 
indicated that most such contracts were written to reward av-
erage performance rather than truly “exceptional” performance. 
Widespread practices such as generous CEO severance benefi ts 
regardless of performance, unsecured company loans to CEOs 
and complex fi nancial arrangements camoufl aging the true ex-
tend of CEO pay all appeared to be contrary to shareholders 
interests.  After the passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) 
in the United States, eff ectively prohibiting some of these prac-
tices, Bebchuk and Fried concluded that the situation may im-
prove slightly.  Nevertheless, given that the underlying cause 
of excessive CEO pay in their view, managerial power, was not 
greatly altered, they considered that signifi cant problems would 
remain, and average CEO pay would remain very high.
Figure 1: Australian Shareholder, Worker and Executive Incomes
Source: John Shields (2005)
Overall, the empirical studies indicate that, even assuming 
diff erences in comparative performance are due to the execu-
tive, the salaries paid to executives of individual corporations 
cannot be justifi ed by their relative impact on the corporation’s 
performance in the majority of cases.  
Putting aside these limitations, there does not appear to be 
evidence at the level of individual corporations that high execu-
tive pay leads to improved economic effi  ciency.  Following the 
work of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others, it had been con-
cluded that corporations performed better where executive pay 
was closely aligned to returns to share holders.  Subsequently 
salary packages were increasingly tied to the corporation’s share 
price, typically by allocating options to purchase shares at a 
discounted price as a performance bonus to the executive.  Yet 
over the past two decades executive salaries have consistently 
risen faster than corporate share prices and returns on invest-
ment.  Figure 1 shows this trend for Australian data from 1990 
to 2005 (Shields 2005).  
Th ere are several reasons why pay schemes as suggested by 
Jensen may lead to higher executive pay outcomes.  Abowd and 
Kaplan (1999) have shown that the reporting rules for share 
options in the 1990s tended to hide the true extent of execu-
tive pay from shareholders and enabled large entitlements to be 
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built up with little scrutiny.  At the same time the share options 
did not motivate executive performance to the degree assumed, 
as they tended to be discounted by executives because they were 
payments both in the future and at risk.  In practice, share bo-
nus schemes resulted in large pay bonuses to executives when 
the overall share market rose, regardless of the comparative per-
formance of the corporation.
Given these fi ndings it is not surprising that, where empiri-
cal studies have been carried out, current levels of executive 
pay could not be justifi ed on the basis of economic effi  ciency. 
Shields (2003) demonstrated that for Australian corporations, 
the correlation between corporate performance and executive 
salary was negative, that is, the highest paid executives control-
led corporations with the lowest comparative performance. 
Recent reforms to requirements for corporate reporting of ex-
ecutive rewards has enabled more complete research of trends. 
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) have carried out a comprehen-
sive analysis of the growth of executive pay in the United States. 
Th eir analysis of the period 1993 to 2003 included both CEOs 
and top-fi ve executive incomes reported for each of 1500 United 
States corporations including small (Small Cap-600), medium 
(Mid-Cap 400) and large (S&P 500) fi rms as defi ned by their 
market capitalization.  Th ey tested whether movements in ex-
ecutive pay could be correlated to individual fi rms size, growth 
or profi tability.  Conclusions were as follows:
• Real growth in executive pay was double what could be ex-
plained by changes in fi rm size, profi tability or market capitali-
zation;
• Growth in equity (performance) based pay has been in ad-
dition to, rather than in lieu of cash compensation.  Th at is, the 
amount of executive pay not at risk has not reduced as perform-
ance pay rose; 
• Th e pay growth trend applied to CEOs and other senior 
executives;
• Th e trend applied to small, medium and large fi rms, though 
was greatest for large fi rms;
Considering Bebchuck and Grinstein’s fi ndings, one conclu-
sions is striking: the quantum of executive pay is now so large 
(aggregate pay to US top fi ve executives now averages 10% of 
aggregate earnings for the 1500 listed corporations) that in it-
self it represents a signifi cant cost to shareholders.  Th is strongly 
suggests that economic rent is being obtained by incumbent 
corporate executives.
Conclusions
Th ere is now a signifi cant body of literature analysing economic 
effi  ciency arguments for or against particular levels of corporate 
executive rewards.  Some consider the argument from a corpo-
rate governance perspective, although few consider the philo-
sophical strengths and weaknesses of the argument.
Despite the large and growing number of empirical studies 
of executive rewards, there are many diffi  culties in reaching 
conclusions based on these studies.  Information on the level of 
corporate rewards is very diffi  cult to determine, particularly the 
value of stock options which are exercised at a future date. For 
empirical arguments, it would also be desirable to base conclu-
sions on trends which are as long term as possible.  Recent im-
provements in corporate accounting requirements for executive 
benefi ts have enabled more rigorous studies of pay and perform-
ance to be completed, such as that by Bebchuk and Grinstein in 
the United States.  In Australia’s case complete information on 
executive rewards has only been available since 2001, making 
long term tend analysis more diffi  cult.
Economic effi  ciency arguments for high executive pay appear 
to face a fundamental diffi  culty for executive positions, with 
the inability to distinguish the contribution of the executive 
from the fortunes of the corporation as a whole.  Attempts to 
compare performance against similar corporations might allow 
comparative evaluation of executives, but still do not resolve the 
diffi  culty of deciding what is an appropriate comparison base. 
Th ere seems no answer to the question of how to determine the 
value of the contribution of the average executive. 
Despite these qualifi cations, it is possible to reach some con-
clusions about the validity of most common arguments used to 
justify executive rewards, and based on empirical evidence of 
recent trends.  Philosophically, the effi  ciency argument could 
potentially be valid, provided the evidence supports it, and 
executive pay markets conform to conditions for free and fair 
markets (which current corporate executive labor markets do 
not meet).  
Empirically the effi  ciency argument appears to be false.  At 
the societal level, there seems to be no evidence that economies 
that pay higher executive pay are more effi  cient.  From Shields 
and Bebchuk’s research, even if all increases in individual corpo-
rations’ economic effi  ciency are assumed to be due to their exec-
utives, they do not appear to be suffi  cient to justify the rewards 
being paid to those executives.  Th us at the level of individual 
corporations the case for large executive rewards to encourage 
economic effi  ciency appears to be false.
To summarise the empirical evidence then, from the view-
point of economic effi  ciency narrowly defi ned, the recent trend 
of rising executive pay is not justifi able by economic effi  ciency in 
Australia.  In the United States both the trend of pay increase 
and the quantum of executive pay is also unjustifi able.  Th is is 
summarized in the following table:
Argument for High Reward Philosophical Theory  Empirical Proof?
Economic effi ciency   Conditionally valid   Societal level: False, Corporate level: False
Economics of Superstars  Not valid    False
Argument against High Reward
Effi cient Labor Market  Valid (criteria for effi cient market)  Executive market fails to meet criteria
Motivational Theories  Valid     Unproven but Plausible
Supply and demand  Valid     True
Burden of proof   Valid    Not applicable
Summary of Arguments for High Corporate Executive Rewards
From a philosophical viewpoint, the economic effi  ciency ar-
gument for high reward appear to be potentially valid.  However 
on the evidence of most studies, it is not empirically true for 
executives in Australia and the United States.  Th erefore the 
current trend of increasing executive salaries would appear to be 
evidence of rent-seeking behavior by incumbent executives.
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